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In November 2013, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum titled 
“Defense Acquisition,” which stated that the 2008 version of the DOD Instruction 
(DODI) 5000.02 required revision in order to create an acquisition policy environment 
that will achieve greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending, and effectively 
implement the Defense Department’s Better Buying Power initiatives. A year later, the 
Interim DODI 5000.02 was issued and required for use, and the final instruction was 
signed into effect in January 2015. While the new instruction canceled six directive-type 
memorandums and reportedly incorporated them in the new instruction, efficiencies are 
not easily identified. This research provides an analysis of the new DODI 5000.02 and 
the Better Buying Power initiatives.   
It was discovered that the efficiencies to be gained have not been properly 
identified. It is left for interpretation what those efficiencies are. If they are decreased 
costs and schedules, the metrics used in this research, they have not been achieved to 
date. Proper metrics for these efficiencies need to be formulated and articulated to the 
defense acquisition workforce. 
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For more than 50 years, Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) have 
explored ways to improve acquisition outcomes, including reform (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2013). In 1971, the DOD issued its initial 5000-series 
acquisition policy. The policy, which totaled only seven pages, provided for minimum 
formal reporting and more streamlined layers of authority (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 
1971). However, over time, it became clear to leadership that a large, complex 
bureaucratic process had supplanted the original efficient construct. So, 15 years after the 
original issue (in 1986), President Regan established his “Blue Ribbon Commission” to 
study defense management and provide recommendations for improvement (President’s 
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986). This commission, commonly 
known as the Packard Commission (after the commission chairman, David Packard), 
reported that the defense acquisition system had “deeply entrenched” problems that 
stemmed from an “increasingly bureaucratic and overregulated process” (President’s 
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986, p. 44).  
This report led to the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1986—a large restructuring of the DOD (Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act, 1986). However, since then, laws, directives, orders and 
regulations governing the defense acquisition system have continued to be published. For 
example, requirements were added to improve cost estimating, logistics planning, design 
reviews, and technology maturity assessments (GAO, 2015b). Each of these areas had 
been in need of improvement, and individual documentation and review requirements 
were aimed at addressing known shortfalls in an effort to make a better system (GAO, 
2015b).  Although the intent of the added requirements was good, significant 
inefficiencies still existed, and improvements were still needed. 
To this end, in November 2013, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a 
memorandum titled “Defense Acquisition.” This memorandum stated that the 2008 
version (hereafter referred to as the old instruction) of the DOD Instruction 5000.02 
required revision in order to create an acquisition policy environment that would achieve 
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greater efficiency and productivity in defense spending, and effectively implement the 
Defense Department’s Better Buying Power (BBP) initiatives (Carter, 2013).  A year 
later, the Interim DOD Instruction (DODI) 5000.02 was issued and required for use, and 
the final instruction was signed into effect in January 2015 (hereafter referred to as the 
new instruction). While this new instruction, in an effort to streamline policy, canceled 
six directive-type memorandums (DTM) and incorporated them in the new instruction, 
efficiencies are not easily identified. 
More than a year after implementation of the new policy, it appears that 
efficiencies and productivity may not yet have been realized. A Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) Report in February 2015 called for a streamlining in the 
decision making process of DOD weapon systems in order to reduce inefficiencies 
(GAO, 2015b). Then, in another GAO report in March 2015, they assessed that most of 
the 78 major defense acquisition programs (MDAP) had experienced a cost increase over 
the past year (GAO, 2015c).  Adding to the bad news, the GAO report also found that the 
time required to deliver capability to the warfighter had increased.  
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The issuance of the new DODI 5000.02 has created the need for program offices 
with planned acquisition baselines to consider the implications of the new guidance. 
While Mr. Kendall, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and 
Logistics (USD, AT&L), does not explicitly call for acquisition reform (Kendall, 2014b), 
he has rewritten the DOD’s instruction on the operation of the Defense Acquisition 
System. The DOD, with the hope that it will allow for greater efficiency and productivity, 
has published the new instruction (Garamone, 2013).   
(1) Primary Research Questions 
The objective of this research is to understand how this new instruction is 
expected to increase efficiencies within the Defense Acquisition System. 
• Since the intent of the new order is to gain efficiencies and productivity 
(Carter, 2013), what are the efficiencies expected to be gained by 
acquisition programs as they implement the changes of the new order? 
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• How have program offices in various stages of the acquisition model 
complied with the new instruction?  
(2) Secondary Research Questions 
In order to find a meaningful answer to the primary research questions, the 
following secondary questions were used to shape the scope of the research: 
• What are the major changes within the new instruction and, more 
importantly, what did the authors of Interim DoDI 5000.02 eliminate, 
change or add to meet the overarching goal of achieving greater efficiency 
and productivity in defense spending? 
• What are the roadblocks (perceived and real) that the program offices are 
experiencing as they incorporate this new guidance? 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The research attempted to answer the research questions utilizing a grounded 
theory strategy. First, a thorough review of the old instruction provided the baseline for 
the analysis. Next, a study of the current regulation documented the differences between 
new instruction and the baseline. This was followed by an analysis of other pertinent 
regulations to further inform research.   
A series of one-on-one interviews followed a semi-structured protocol to gather 
stakeholders’ views on the research questions. The stakeholders were acquisition 
professionals that worked within the defense acquisition system. The interviews assessed 
stakeholder opinions of the changes provided by the new instruction. Finally, using 
grounded theory techniques, the study utilized a qualitative analysis of the data, and 
reported findings, conclusions and recommendations. 
C. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I of this research provides background for the problem and defines the 
research objectives, questions, scope, and methodology. Chapter II provides a detailed 
review of DOD Instruction 5000.02, and the differences between the 2008 (old) version, 
and the 2015 (new) version. The research includes an analysis of other pertinent 
regulatory and statutory documents as they relate to the Defense Acquisition System. 
Chapter III presents the data, including the specific opinions of the stakeholders 
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interviewed, and the overall findings of the qualitative analysis. Chapter IV reveals the 
conclusions and provides recommendations for further research. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has reviewed the history of the DOD Instruction from its first 
issuance of seven pages in 1971, to today’s instruction. The current state of budget 
overruns and schedule slippages were introduced to highlight the problem and provide 
the background for the need to update the instruction. This problem has been refined into 
research objectives with research questions, and special emphasis on the importance of 
this study. Finally, the scope and methodology were set forth. Next, we will take a closer 
look at the regulatory and statutory directives used in this analysis. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A study of past and present literature was critical to understanding the defense 
acquisition system. First, a review of the GAO reports mentioned in Chapter I, followed 
by pertinent past acquisition documentation, including the old instruction, focused on the 
changes over time, and the reasoning for the same. Next, a study of the new DODI 
5000.02 identified the changes incorporated from the previous instruction and other 
directives. Finally, the review studied the Better Buying Power initiatives, and other 
relevant policies.  
A. GAO REPORT 15-192: ACQUISITION REFORM, DOD SHOULD 
STREAMLINE ITS DECISION-MAKING PROCESS FOR WEAPON 
SYSTEMS TO REDUCE INEFFICIENCIES 
In February 2015, as mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act for 
fiscal year 2014, the GAO reviewed the DOD’s acquisition process (National Defense 
Authorization Act [NDAA] for Fiscal Year 2014, 2013). The GAO report highlighted 
that programs spend an unnecessary amount of time and resources documenting the 
information required at milestones, and that the large number of required stakeholder 
reviews contributed to the problems (GAO, 2015b). According to the report, on average, 
over two years was spent by the program offices answering numerous requests for 
information for the programs most recent milestone decision.  
A primary reason it takes over two years to complete the information required for 
a milestone decision is the large number of stakeholders that review the documents at the 
many organizational levels above the program office. The GAO found that the milestone 
decision reviews by over eight different levels of stakeholders added only moderate or 
less value to most documents (GAO, 2015b). DOD recognizes that it has too many levels 
of review and has accomplished several initiatives to eliminate the inefficiency (GAO, 
2015b). However, the changes have resulted in limited success with reducing the time 
and effort needed to review documentation.(GAO, 2015b) 
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B. GAO REPORT 15–342SP: DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS, ASSESSMENTS 
OF SELECTED WEAPON PROGRAMS 
In March 2015, the GAO published its annual assessment of DOD weapon system 
acquisitions, an area on GAO’s high-risk list (GAO, 2015c). The report highlighted that 
defense acquisition programs continued to experience cost and schedule overruns.  
Further, GAO emphasized the need to sustain the implementation of acquisition reforms, 
and complete developmental testing before beginning production. Forty-one programs in 
the portfolio lost buying power during the past year, resulting in $5.3 billion in additional 
costs (see Table 1) (GAO, 2015c). 
Table 1.   Buying Power Analysis for the 2014 Portfolio (Fiscal Year 2015, 
dollars in billions) (from GAO, 2015c) 
 
 
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE 5000.1: ACQUISITION OF 
MAJOR DEFENSE SYSTEMS 
Issued in July 1971, this was the first of the 5000 series regulations of the defense 
acquisition systems (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1971). Only seven pages long, the 
directive called for decentralized authority in defense acquisition, with minimal layers of 
authority between the program manager (PM) and the Component Head.  Specifically, 
the original guidance provided for: 
• Minimal layers of authority above the program office (Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, 1971, p. 2)  
• Very limited demands on programs for formal reporting (Deputy Secretary 
of Defense, 1971, p. 6) 
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• Minimal demands for non-recurring information and for responding to 
these requests informally (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1971, p. 6)  
• The development of a single, key document to support program 
management and milestone decision making (Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, 1971, p. 3) 
D. DOD DIRECTIVE 5000.01: THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM 
DOD Directive 5000.01, dated May 12, 2003 and certified current as of 
November 20, 2007, provides management principles and overarching policy of the 
Defense Acquisition System (USD (AT&L), 2007). Including its one enclosure, the 
directive is only ten pages long. The directive gives wide-ranging guidance on acquisition 
management areas such as competition, cost, affordability, and performance-based 
acquisitions and logistics (PBL).  
E. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DOD REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1986 
President Regan’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management in 1986 
identified the same problems that plague the defense acquisition system today, namely, 
the stifling burdens of regulation, reporting, and oversight” (President’s Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Defense Management, 1986, p. xi). The recommendations from this 
report led Congress to pass the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986. The Act was a major restructuring of the DOD, 
strengthening the civilian authority over the department by aligning the Combatant 
Commanders to the Secretary of Defense, bypassing the service chiefs. (Goldwater-
Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, 1986) The Act also delegated all 
defense acquisition responsibility to the USD AT&L. Before this Act, the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense and various other under-secretaries and assistant-secretaries had 




F. DIRECTIVE TYPE MEMORANDUM 11-009: ACQUISTION POLICY 
FOR DEFENSE BUSINESS SYSTEMS 
DTM 11-009 was issued in June of 2011, and canceled in November 2013 with 
the issuance of the interim DODI 5000.02. DTM 11-009 established the policy that 
required the use of the Business Capability Life cycle (BCL) model as the acquisition 
model for defense business systems (DBS). Under this policy, an acquisition process 
must reach IOC with five years from MS A (USD (AT&L), 2011b). As seen in Figure 1, 
DTM 11-009 provided an incremental acquisition model, referred to as the Business Case 





Figure 1.  BCL Acquisition Business Model (from USD (AT&L), 2011b) 
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G. DODI 5000.02: OPERATION OF THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION 
SYSTEM 
Many of the changes from the 2008 DODI 5000.02 to the interim instruction 
issued in November 2013 (and finalized in January 2015) include the incorporation of 
previously implemented policy contained in numerous DTMs, policy memos, directives, 
instructions and other guidance issued since 2008. Of particular note are the cancellation 
of the following DTMs, and the incorporation of that material into the interim instruction 
(DOD, 2015):  
• DTM 09–025: Space Systems Acquisition Policy 
• DTM 09–027: Implementation of WSARA 2009 
• DTM 10–015: Requirements for Life Cycle Management and Product 
Support 
• DTM 10–017: Development Planning 
• DTM 11–003: Reliability Analysis, Planning, Tracking, and Reporting 
• DTM 11–009: Acquisition Policy for Defense Business Systems 
1. General Changes 
Many of the changes from the old instruction are related simply to naming 
conventions. For example, the Test and Evaluation Strategy is now called the Test and 
Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) and the Development RFP Release Decision Point is the 
new name for the Pre-Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Point. The 
following overview of the changes between the two versions of the instruction provides a 
foundation for the research. The new instruction is 74 pages larger than the previous 
edition and includes five new enclosures. (See the Appendix for a complete list of the 
differences.)  
The new instruction authorizes and strongly encourages milestone decision 
authorities (MDA) to tailor regulatory requirements and procedures, to include strategies, 
oversight, program information, phase content, timing and scope of decision reviews, and 
decision levels based on the specifics of the product being required. However, in some 
instances, program offices that tried to tailor their programs found it too difficult to 
obtain waivers for milestone requirements. The significant time and effort was found to 
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be onerous, and program offices often found it easier to simply complete the 
requirements rather than try to obtain waivers (GAO, 2015b). 
2. Program Models 
The 2008 instruction provided one acquisition program model for program offices 
to follow (see Figure 2). The new instruction provides examples of six program models 
(DOD, 2008). These models have been reported as a highlight of the new instruction 
(Manning, 2015). DOD’s intent for these models is to not be restrictive in nature, but 
rather to provide a starting point for acquisition program planning (DOD, 2015). Mr. 
Kendall continues to emphasize this point when speaking about the new order and model 
examples by stating that “program managers and program executive officers should use 
these models as references to assist their thought processes and analysis” (Roulo, 2015).  
Figures 3 through 8 provide the new models with descriptions to include their intended 
uses. 
 





a. Model 1: Hardware-Intensive Program 
This model includes most weapon systems and programs, such as tactical radios 
with significant hardware development. This is the “classic” model that has existed in 
some form in all previous editions of DODI 5000.02 (see Figure 3). It is the starting point 
for most military weapon systems. However, these products almost always contain 
software development resulting in some form of Hybrid Model A (DOD, 2015). 
 















b. Model 2: Defense Unique Software Intensive Programs 
The next model is designed for the development of DOD unique software 
requiring multiple software builds before a product can be fielded (see Figure 4). 
Examples of this type of product include military unique command and control systems, 
and significant upgrades to the combat systems found on major weapons systems, such as 
surface combatants and tactical aircraft (DOD, 2015). 
 














c. Model 3: Incrementally Fielded Software Intensive Programs 
Figure 5 is a model that has been adopted for many defense business systems. It 
also applies to upgrades to some command and control systems or weapons systems 
software, where deployment of the full capability will occur in multiple increments as 
new capability is developed and delivered, nominally in 1- to 2- year cycles. The period 
of each increment should not be arbitrarily constrained. The length of each increment and 
the number of deployable increments should be tailored, and based on the logical 
progression of development and deployment for use in the field for the specific product 
being acquired (DOD, 2015). 
 
Figure 5.  Incrementally Fielded Software Intensive Program (from DOD, 
2015) 
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d. Model 4: Accelerated Acquisition Programs 
Figure 6 is a model that applies when schedule considerations dominate over cost 
and technical risk considerations. This model compresses or eliminates phases of the 
process, and accepts the potential for inefficiencies in order to achieve a deployed 
capability on a compressed schedule (DOD, 2015). 
 















e. Model 5: Hybrid Model A (Hardware Dominant) 
Figure 7 is a model depicting how a major weapons system combines hardware 
development as the basic structure, with a software intensive development that is 
occurring simultaneously with the hardware development program (DOD, 2015). 
 
















f. Model 6: Hybrid Model B (Software Dominant) 
Figure 8 depicts how a software intensive product development can include a mix 
of incrementally deployed software products or releases that include intermediate 
software builds (DOD, 2015). 
 













H. BETTER BUYING POWER 
Better Buying Power (BBP) is the implementation of best practices to strengthen 
the Defense Department’s buying power, improve industry productivity, and provide an 
affordable, value-added military capability to the Warfighter (“What Is Better Buying 
Power?”, n.d.). Launched in 2010, BBP encompasses a set of fundamental acquisition 
principles to achieve greater efficiencies through affordability, cost control, elimination 
of unproductive processes and bureaucracy, and promotion of competition. Also, BBP 
initiatives incentivize productivity and innovation in industry and Government, and 
should improve tradecraft in the acquisition of services. Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics (AT&L) has identified 36 initiatives grouped under seven focus-areas to restore 
affordability in defense procurement and improve defense industry productivity (“What 
Is Better Buying Power?”, n.d.). 
BBP 1.0 was introduced in 2010 as part of the DOD’s Efficiency Initiative. The 
objective was to deliver war-fighting capabilities needed within the constraints of a 
declining defense budget, by achieving better buying power for the Warfighters and 
taxpayer (Carter, 2015). 
BBP 2.0 rolled out in November 2012 and marked the next step in the Department 
of Defense’s process of continuous improvement. BBP 2.0’s objective was to help 
improve the Department’s effectiveness in the tradecraft of acquisition. Many initiatives 
that were first introduced in BBP 1.0 remained, while a set of new initiatives were 
identified and added to address security and fiscal realities (Kendall, 2013b). 
BBP 2.0 has 36 initiatives that are organized into seven focus areas. These focus 
areas are: 
• Achieve Affordable Programs 
• Control Costs throughout the Product Life cycle 
• Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in Industry and Government 
• Eliminate Unproductive Processes and Bureaucracy 
• Promote Effective Competition 
• Improve Tradecraft in Acquisition of Services 
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In September 2014, The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L 
released the interim version of BBP 3.0. This white paper provided insight into the future 
release of BBP as a continuation of the first two initiatives.  
The progression from BBP 1.0 to 2.0 reflected a change in emphasis from 
specific “best practices” to an increased emphasis on helping acquisition 
professionals think critically and make better decisions as they confront 
the myriad, complex situations we encounter in defense acquisition. In 
BBP 2.0 we emphasized professionalism and providing better tools to help 
the acquisition professionals in DOD make sound decisions. We also 
continued many initiatives from BBP 1.0 and made adjustments in some 
areas based on our experience and feedback from industry and 
government. BBP 3.0 continues the focus on continuous improvement 
with a new emphasis on initiatives that encourage innovation and promote 
technical excellence with the overarching goal of ensuring that the United 
States’ military has the dominant capabilities to meet future national 
security requirements (Kendall, 2014a, p. 2). 
Particularly noteworthy in BBP 3.0 is the emphasis on using and expanding the 
use of performance-based logistics. Mr. Kendall’s white paper goes so far as to say, “We 
believe there is opportunity for more progress in expanding the use of PBL, and it will be 
receiving additional emphasis and management attention going forward” (Kendall, 
2014a, p. 5). 
I. FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) is the primary regulation for use by all 
Federal Executive agencies in their acquisition of supplies and services with appropriated 
funds (General Services Administration, 2005). With its 52 different parts and appendix, 
the FAR is a massive regulation. Originally published in 1984, the most recent version of 
the FAR (published in March 2005) is issued within applicable laws, under the joint 
authorities of the Administrator of General Services, the Secretary of Defense, and the 
Administrator for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The content of the 
FAR follows the broad policy guidelines of the Administrator, Office of Federal 
Procurement Policy, Office of Management and Budget.  
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J. TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE 2337 
In an effort to control life cycle costs, Congress passed the National Defense 
Authorization Act of 2010 stating that, “The Secretary of Defense shall require that each 
major weapon system be supported by a product support manager (PSM)…to…maximize 
value to the Department of Defense by providing the best possible product support 
outcomes at the lowest operations and support cost” (NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, 2009, 
sect. 805, para. b1). The U.S. Code, 10 USC 2337 defined the responsibilities for the 
PSM, as follows (Life Cycle Management and Product Support, 2013): 
• Develop and implement a comprehensive product support strategy for the 
weapon system. 
• Use appropriate predictive analysis and modeling tools that can improve 
material availability and reliability, increase operational availability rates, 
and reduce operation and sustainment costs. 
• Conduct appropriate cost analyses to validate the product support strategy, 
including cost-benefit analyses. 
• Ensure achievement of desired product support outcomes, through 
development and implementation of appropriate product support 
arrangements. 
• Adjust performance requirements and resource allocations across product 
support integrators and product support providers, as necessary to 
optimize implementation of the product support strategy. 
• Periodically review product support arrangements between the product 
support integrators and product support providers, to ensure the 
arrangements are consistent with the overall product support strategy. 
• Prior to each change in the product support strategy or every five years, 
whichever occurs first, revalidate any business-case analysis performed in 
support of the product support strategy. 
• Ensure that the product support strategy maximizes small business 
participation at the appropriate tiers; and 
• Ensure that product support arrangements for the weapon system describe 
how such arrangements will ensure efficient procurement, management, 
and allocation of Government-owned parts inventories, in order to prevent 




K. DIRECTIVE TYPE MEMORANDUM 10-015: REQUIREMENTS FOR 
LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT AND PRODUCT SUPPORT 
DTM 10-015 was issued in October of 2010, updated in April of 2011, and 
canceled in November of 2013 with the issuance of the interim DODI 5000.02. DTM 10–
015 required the assignment of a Product Support Manager for ACAT I and II programs 
and defined the roles of that assignment, which mirrored what Congress passed in the 
National Defense Authorization Act of 2010  (USD (AT&L), 2011a). 
L. SUMMARY 
As previously stated, a study of past and present literature was critical to 
understanding the defense acquisition system. First, a review of the GAO reports found 
that the changes over time have resulted in limited success with reducing the time and 
effort needed to review documentation (GAO, 2015b). 
Next, a study of the new DODI 5000.02 confirmed that although guidance allows 
programs to tailor regulatory requirements and procedures to improve efficiency, they 
sometimes found it too difficult to obtain waivers for milestone requirements. Finally, a 
study of the BBP initiatives found that BBP 3.0 places emphasis on using and expanding 
the use of performance-based logistics.   
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III. ANALYSIS 
This chapter continues the examination of the literature introduced in Chapter II, 
while also studying the stakeholders’ interview responses, in order to answer each of the 
primary and secondary research questions. The primary research question involves a 
comparison between the planned efficiencies gained and the actual efficiencies gained. 
This data and analysis are presented in Section B. The two secondary research questions 
require an internal analysis of the new instruction, to include an analysis of how well the 
program offices have implemented the changes from the old instruction. The data and 
analysis pertaining to the secondary research questions are presented in Section C.  
A. QUALITATIVE STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
The qualitative structured interviews were conducted with four experts in the 
defense acquisition field. The four professionals included a Deputy Program Executive 
Officer (Acquisition), an Assistant Program Executive Officer (Logistics), an ACAT I 
Product Support Manager, and an ACAT I Technical Director for Logistics. They were 
selected through industry contacts based on their interest in participation. The time 
commitment was significant (45–60 minutes), as the researcher met individually with 
each of the four individuals to accomplish the semi-structured interview. All four of the 
participants agreed to be recorded, and the recordings were analyzed for themes patterns, 
differences and discrepancies. 
1. Interview Questions 
The interviews were semi-structured, and guided by the following four research 
questions: 
• For the program or programs that you oversee, have you incorporated the 
new instruction, and if so, did you find improvements in efficiency or 
productivity? 
• How has the new instruction impacted your program level activities? 
• What are some of the practical differences for program office execution of 
acquisition process using the new instruction, including documentation? 
• Are processes any more or any less rigid than before the issuance of 
Interim DODI 5000.02? 
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2. Summary of Interviews 
Throughout the interviews, there were five common themes that surfaced, 
including cost, competition, the PSM, the new acquisition models, and increased 
oversight (see Table 2).    
Table 2.   Common Themes during Interviews 
 
B. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS:  ANALYSIS OF THE 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PLANNED EFFICIENCIES AND ACTUAL 
EFFICIENCIES 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines efficiency as, “…the ability to do 
something or produce something without wasting materials, time, or energy: the quality 
or degree of being efficient” (Merriam-Webster, 2015). In order to compare the planned 
efficiencies to the actual efficiencies, one must know the planned efficiencies were. This 
presented a problem, as the new efficiencies were not been defined, and there are no 
specific measures of performance (MOPs). No mention of the definition of the 
efficiencies or the MOPs was found in the literature review, including, the new order, 
white papers, sound bites or press releases.  
Common Themes in Interviews Occurrence 
Cost 4 of 4 
Competition in Acquisitions 3 of 4 
Product Support Manager 3 of 4 
Acquisition Models 2 of 4 
Increased Oversight 2 of 4 
 24 
  None of the interview participants could identify any new efficiency(ies), but 
perhaps this was a result of the lack of definition of the planned efficiencies, or the 
related MOPs. The closest semblance to a definition of an efficiency and MOP was a 
general goal. The Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy Directorate stated that the 
new order “will support effective strategic management of services across the DOD, 
contributing to the achievement of greater efficiency and productivity in Defense 
spending, as detailed in USD (AT&L)’s BBP 2.0 initiative” (Director, Defense 
Procurement and Acquisition Policy, n.d., p. 3). 
Due to the lack of definition of efficiencies or MOPs, and only high-level, general 
goals, this research will define buying power and group BBP 2.0’s focus areas into 
efficiency categories related to the defense acquisition program’ cost, schedule, and 
performance.   
The GAO defines buying power as “the amount of goods or services that can be 
purchased given a specified level of funding” (GAO, 2015c, p. 14). Clearly, buying 
power is how much stuff can be bought with a given amount of funds. When a program 
can purchase more without an increase in cost, the program has gained buying power. 
Subsequently, when the price of the product rises, without an increase in quantity of the 
product, the program has lost buying power. 
As Table 3 shows, the seven focus areas can be tied to a specific efficiency. Of 
particular note, the focus areas are not mutually exclusive, and any gain in one area can, 
and should be a catalyst for a gain in another area. For example, an elimination of an 







Table 3.   BBP 2.0 Focus Areas and Efficiency Categories 
 
This table organizes the efficiencies in terms of “areas.” With the efficiency areas 
defined, it is possible to analyze the data from the area to determine if any efficiencies 
have been realized. (The actual criterion for each of the areas is necessary to measure 
how good or bad a difference is. For example, the new instruction may aim to “Eliminate 
Unproductive Processes and Bureaucracy,” by an MOP average improvement in schedule 
of six months (MOP) to “meet” the criterion. Anything better or worse than the six-
month goal would have to be defined as better or worse. This is the responsibility of 
policy makers, and cannot be determined by the researcher.) 
 
Focus Area Efficiency 
Area 
Achieve Affordable Programs Cost 
Control Costs Throughout the Product Life cycle Cost 
Incentivize Productivity and Innovation in Industry and Government Performance 
Eliminate Unproductive Processes and Bureaucracy Schedule 
Promote Effective Competition Cost 
Improve Tradecraft in Acquisition of Services Performance 
Improve the Professionalism of the Total Acquisition Workforce Schedule 
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1. Efficiency Area: Cost 
Controlling costs reigns supreme in acquisition program management priorities. 
As of December 2014, the DOD’s portfolio of MDAPs included 78 programs with a total 
estimated acquisition cost of roughly $1.4 trillion (GAO, 2015b). Three of the seven BBP 
2.0 focus areas focus directly on cost. Even though the other four focus areas focus more 
on other efficiency areas, they have direct and indirect impact on cost (e.g., longer 
schedule often results in higher costs). All four interview participants spoke about costs. 
The new instruction echoes BBP 2.0’s emphasis on costs, and provides guidance on the 
use of “should-cost” from the beginning of the acquisition life-cycle, through contract 
negotiations, program execution, and life cycle sustainment (DOD, 2015). 
“Should-cost” is a new term, not used in the old instruction, and mentioned 24 
times in the new instruction, with a couple of paragraphs dedicated to the term in the 
Program Management enclosure (DOD, 2015). Secretary of Defense Carter, while still 
serving as the USD AT&L, defined should-cost as “a tool to manage all costs throughout 
the life cycle…to constrain our requirements appetites in order to control the final 
product unit and sustainment costs” (Carter, 2011, p. 1) This reference to the cost per 
final product unit is the definition of buying power. 
As reviewed in Chapter II, the GAO reported in March 2015 that 41 of the 78 
MDAPs lost buying power this year with a result of an additional $5.3 billion in costs 
(GAO, 2015c). When assessed against the first full year estimates, the total cost of the 
2014 portfolio has increased by over $457 billion (GAO, 2015c). With a thorough 
understanding the implications of this data, it was possible to determine that there have 
not been any cost savings due to the new instruction, at least, not to date. 
2. Efficiency Area: Schedule 
Schedule delays have been a constant theme in the annual GAO assessment of 
DOD weapon system acquisitions since 2006. The current average schedule delay is 
more than 29 months, or over 36 percent, and these increases are proportionally higher 
than those seen in past assessments (GAO, 2015c). 
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a. The Effect of Oversight on Schedule Efficiency 
The amount of oversight of the program offices was a major theme that was 
uncovered during the interviews. As Figure 9 shows, there is a very rigid vertical chain of 
command with many intermediaries between the program offices and their MDAs. This 
problem is further exacerbated because many different functional organizations within 
each level that perform reviews, depending on the information. Furthermore, being a 
vertical hierarchy, the information being reviewed does not flow up to the next level until 
it is approved at the current rung of the ladder.  
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The DOD is well aware that its extensive review process is a challenge. A DOD 
study in 2011 highlighted the many organizational levels of oversight and reported that 
DOD has a “checkers checking checkers” system, which contributes to inefficiencies that 
can undermine program managers’ execution of programs (Defense Business Board, 
2011).  The study stated this is because the program offices must spend too much time 
complying with the oversight process, including documenting the information 
requirements.  This is backed up by a recent finding from the GAO that reported program 
offices took on average of more than two years to complete information requirements, 
with a review process that could include as many as 56 stakeholders, across eight 
organizational levels above the program office (Garamone, 2013). 
The elimination of unproductive processes and bureaucracy is one of the BBP 3.0 
initiatives. Mr. Kendall’s white paper points out that, “left to their own devices, 
staffs…will…inject themselves in the acquisition chain of command” (Kendall, 2014a, p. 
7). While this is an ongoing struggle that is acknowledged by all levels, there is no 
evidence that the new instruction has done anything to improve the process and system. 
In fact, there are new required reviews, such as the CDD Validation and Development 
RFP Decision prior to MS B. The new RFP Decision is described by the USD AT&L as, 
“the most important single decision point in the entire life cycle, because the release of 
the Engineering and Manufacturing Development RFP sets in motion everything that 
follows in a products’ life cycle” (Kendall, 2013a, p. 1). The USD AT&L emphasis on 
this may cause a ripple effect through the chain of command (See Figure 9), of additional 
unnecessary (and not required) decision reviews at each level. 
b. The Effect of Competition on Schedule Efficiency 
Interview participants had a very keen understanding of the effects of competition 
on schedules. The strict adherence to the competition clauses of the FAR, 5000.02, and 
BBP initiatives has put an unforeseen burden on the program offices and acquisition 
system. A quick search on the GAO’s website reveals the GAO has rendered 68 decisions 
on competition clause bid protests in the first three months of 2015 (U.S. GAO, 2015). 
These protests prevent programs from moving forward, and bring about schedule delays.   
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One example provided by an interviewee was a 2014 protest of a sole-source 
contract to Rolls-Royce for performance-based logistics for the KC-130J propulsion 
system, which included engine and propeller repairs. The protestor argued that the 
contract improperly bundled the engine and propeller requirements and they should be 
competed separately (GAO, 2015a). However, the propulsion system had been 
maintained by Rolls-Royce since 2002, and by all accounts was a win-win for industry 
and the government for over a decade. The program office felt that they were getting 
good value and the KC-130J operators, and maintainers were happy with the support. The 
protest was ultimately denied by the GAO, however there were numerous effects on the 
program office, including: 
• A contract modification had to be issued to extend the period of 
performance on the existing contract to cover the time it took to resolve 
the protest (GAO, 2015a) 
• Seeing an opening, another company filed a protest on the same contract 
(GAO, 2015a) 
• Over a year was spent by the program office and support staff working 
with the original protestor, trying to help them understand why the 
contract could only be serviced by the original equipment manufacturer 
(GAO, 2015a) 
This point is compounded when it is understood that if the support for the 
propellers was un-bundled from the engines, the savings was estimated to be around 
$40,000, or 0.02% of the sole-source contract price. As the interviewee offered, “You are 
squeezing savings out of the contract, but you are increasing the burden and workload on 
the government with multiple contracts and competitions.” And there lies the problem 
with strict enforcement of competition, the costs associated with the extra solicitations, 
selection committees, and contract management are often not considered or captured. 
While this is just one example, it is not uncommon in the defense acquisition system. As 
previously noted, the GAO issued 68 bid protest decisions in the first three months of this 
year (2015) (U.S. GAO, 2015). 
3. Efficiency Area: Performance 
Performance, from the perspective of acquisition management, is the “operational 
and support characteristics of the system that allow it to effectively and efficiently 
 31 
perform its assigned mission over time. The support characteristics of the system include 
both supportability aspects of the design, and the support elements necessary for system 
operation” (Hagan, 2009, p. B-132). Generally speaking, the greater the performance, the 
greater the cost. While this research did not focus specifically on performance, there were 
no efficiencies in performance discovered, however there were not any deficiencies 
discovered in the process either. 
C. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS: ANALYSIS OF THE NEW 
INSTRUCTION AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
Secondary Research Question number one requires an in-depth look at the new 
instruction to determine what changes to the instruction were made to increase 
efficiencies. A complete list of the changes can be found in the Appendix. The new 
instruction authorizes and strongly encourages MDAs to tailor regulatory requirements, 
procedures, and decision levels based on the specifics of the product being required. 
However, in some instances program office attempts to obtain waivers for milestone 
requirements involved too much additional time and effort to comply. 
The new instruction offers six program models for acquisition offices to use as a 
baseline to start from. While touted across-the-board as “new,” some were actually just 
renamed. The new “Incrementally Fielded Software Intensive” program model is the 
same as the “BCL Acquisition Business Model,” published in 2011. The interviews 
confirmed that the program offices have been tailoring for some time (as much as they 
could), the original program model offered in the old instruction, including what is now 
called the “Hardware Intensive” program model in the new instruction. This tailoring 
occurred long before the publishing of the new instruction. However, one interview 
participant did convey that in the future, program offices will have the regulatory 
authorization to tailor their acquisition models, and will no longer need to produce 
justification for that action. 
Secondary Research Question number two dealt with uncovering any roadblocks 
to implementing the new instruction. While the new instruction provides new decision 
points and offers tailor-ability of the models, most interviewees considered the new 
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instruction as just a revision of old policy, with the Better Buying Power initiatives 
woven in. All interview participants had a strong grasp on the new instruction and did not 
see any roadblocks with incorporating the new policies. This is interesting, because if the 
experts do not see anything as different, especially as it pertains to greater efficiency and 
productivity, then there is potentially an indication of a real problem that could be any 
one or a combination of factors that include: 
• The workforce needs training in the new instruction 
• The program offices are not paying attention to the intent of the new 
instruction, or 
• The new instruction misses the mark and does not provide any new 
efficiencies. 
These possibilities are discussed further in Chapter IV. 
D. SUMMARY 
The continued examination of the literature discussed that the lack of definition or 
MOPs for the planned efficiencies from the new instruction. The primary research 
question focus on the comparison between the planned efficiencies gained and the actual 
efficiencies gained uncovered that none of the interview participants could identify any 
new efficiencies. However, the identification of seven focus areas included an analysis 
that tied each of them to a specific efficiency.   
An analysis of the first of the two secondary research questions found that 
although the instruction authorizes and strongly encourages MDAs to tailor regulatory 
requirements, but in some instances it required too much additional time and effort to 
comply. The six program models offered as new were found to be similar to previous 
versions. However, new regulatory authorization to tailor acquisition models may 
eliminate the need to produce justification for that action. 
Secondary Research Question number two dealt with uncovering any roadblocks 
to implementing the new instruction. All interview participants had a strong grasp on the 
new instruction and did not see any roadblocks with incorporating the new policies. The 
experts do not appear to see many differences between the new and old guidance, and the 
examination of why is discussed further in Chapter IV. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, SUMMARY AND 
AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In the acquisition community, efforts to make the defense acquisition process 
more streamlined have been met with appreciation. Still, potential conflicts could loom 
down the line as program managers work to implement a process that hinges on critical 
thinking, the construction of business case analyses and deliberate decision-making—
potentially time-consuming exercises—rather than adherence to specific rules as in the 
past (Corrin, 2015). 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of this research lead to several conclusions about the Defense 
Acquisition System, the policies that govern it, and the new 5000.02 in particular. This 
research concludes that there is no empirical evidence that demonstrates that the new 
DODI 5000.02 will increase the efficiency of the defense acquisition system. The 
research shows the opposite, and in fact, program offices are more constrained than 
before. The new instruction adds 74 pages of regulation, two new decision points, and 
has not removed any burden on the program offices. These new decision points will only 
increase bureaucratic oversight on the program offices, increasing their workloads and 
costs. Some key findings that support this conclusion are as follows: 
First, the efficiencies and greater productivity expressed by the USD (AT&L) 
have not been defined, and are left for interpretation. As studied in this research, if the 
efficiencies were planned to be decreased costs and reduced schedule time, they have not 
yet been achieved.  
While the new order provides regulatory approval for MDAs to tailor their 
programs as they see fit, they are still bound to the burdensome statutory requirements. 
The interview participants confirmed that any the program tailored waiver process would 
in some cases be more burdensome as complying with the original policy. 
Secondly, the majority of acquisition programs were found to have lost buying 
power in 2014. It can be argued that there has not yet been enough time to measure the 
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new order’s effects. However, the Interim 5000.02 was issued in November 2013, and 
Better Buying Power 2.0 was issued a full year before. It has been two and a half years 
since the efficiency initiatives have been mandated. In light of the recent GAO reports, 
and when measured against the efficiencies of cost and schedule, there are no efficiencies 
reported to date.  
Finally, the defense acquisition system appears to need reform. Though not the 
intent of this research, one can conclude that the desired acquisition system cannot be 
brought to fruition through white papers and instruction rewrites. A complete overhaul of 
the system will be needed to bring about the efficiencies envisioned in the Packard 
Commission, which are still the goal. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The literature indicated that the new order efficiencies need to be defined. The 
new instruction took more than a year to write and publish for the acquisition community. 
This massive effort appears unfinished, since the community is unsure what the effects of 
this new instruction are. A white paper from the office of the USD (AT&L) explaining 
what the efficiencies are would be a starting point. Once the efficiencies are defined, the 
method of measuring these efficiencies (MOPs) also needs to be defined. Table 3 in 
Chapter III above may be the beginnings of a model that could help define and lay out 
MOPs. 
Secondly, the new decision points will require time and resources. The time 
needed to prepare for the decisions at each level of the bureaucracy needs to be 
understood. Along with the time, there are costs tied to these reviews and decision points. 
As program offices prepare for newly leveled requirements, schedules will slip and costs 
will rise.   
The authors of the new instruction did not appear to consider how those offices 
already in the acquisition cycle would be impacted. It is recommended that any new 
acquisition policy address how the community will implement the policy. Simply 
canceling an old policy and ordering the use of a new one, leads to confusion.  
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Thirdly, once the efficiencies are defined, they need to be measured. The 
development of meaningful metrics is the single most important function in process 
improvement. If you don’t know where you’re going, as the adage goes, how will you 
know when you get there (Etem, 2013)? One interview participant offered that DOD 
measures schedule the wrong way. This stakeholder offered that the way DOD currently 
measures schedule is by reaching the program’s published Initial Operating Capability 
(IOC) date. IOC is defined as “being attained when some units and/or organizations in 
the force structure scheduled to receive a system have received it and have the ability to 
employ and maintain it” (Hagan, 2009, p. B-88) The specifics for any particular system’s 
IOC are defined in that system’s Capabilities Development Document (CDD).   
Once an IOC is defined, program offices generally work backwards from there to 
determine the acquisition schedule. Instead, perhaps acquisition programs should be 
grouped by technical type and sophistication. For example, when using the program 
models offered in the new instruction, group all hardware intensive acquisition programs 
together, and measure the time it took each program to get through the five acquisition 
phases (see Figure 10). (Note: All of the data used in the following section is “dummy” 
data, used for illustrative purposes, and do not represent any real-world programs.) 
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Figure 10.  Program Timelines 
From this data, the average, minimum, and maximum times to complete each 
phase can be grouped (see Table 4). 
Table 4.   Program Times in Acquisition Phases 
Program MSA Phase TMRR Phase EMD Phase P&D Phase O&S Phase 
Program 1  12   21   22   44   45  
Program 2  13   25   22   39   43  
Program 3  14   22   26   45   50  
Program 4  10   22   24   40   46  
Program 5  11   21   20   43   39  
Program 6  15   14   21   42   50  
Program 7  14   20   29   40   33  
Program 8  14   18   23   38   48  
Program 9  12   22   20   44   45  
Program 10  10   12   19   36   44  
Min Value  10   12   19   36   33  
Max Value  15   25   29   45   50  
Average  13   20   23   41   44  
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Then, a baseline can be determined based on past history and how long a new 
program should take to get through the acquisition model (see Figure 11). Using the 
baselines for comparison, programs can be measured and targets for improvement can be 
identified.   
 
Figure 11.  Baseline Program Timeline 
While simple, this is a top-level measurement tool, with clear, practical utility for 
optimizing acquisition program schedules.  
C. OTHER FINDINGS 
In the course of this research, another finding has emerged in the logistics field of 
acquisition management. Enclosure 6 of the new instruction, “Life-Cycle Sustainment,” 
is completely new to the 5000.02. While the old instruction had the topic of logistics 
sprinkled throughout, the new instruction dedicates an entire enclosure to the topic. This 
has been met with enthusiasm within the logistics field. As one interview participant 
offered, “Logistics is now a focus in acquisition.”  
The new instruction directs that the Program Manager, with the support of the 
Product Support Manager, develop a product support strategy that will employ should-
cost analysis and metrics (DOD, 2015). As described in Chapter II, the position of the 
PSM was written into law in 2010, in an effort to control the costs of acquisition products 
over their entire lifespan, cradle to grave. The addition of the Life-Cycle Sustainment 
enclosure to the new order does more than just incorporate new legislation since the 
issuance of the old order. It brings the logistics community to the forefront of defense 
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acquisitions. Over 70% of life-cycle costs come after the acquisition, when the system is 
in operation and sustainment (O & S) (GAO, 2012). Any efficiency gained in O & S 
would pay dividends to the total acquisition system. 
D. SUMMARY 
This research provides an analysis of the new 5000.02 and the instruction’s ability 
to deliver greater efficiency and productivity to defense acquisition programs. The 2015 
instruction has been compared and contrasted with the 2008 version, to identify the 
pertinent changes as they pertain to increased efficiency. The Better Buying Power 
initiatives have also been examined. 
Although the new instruction incorporated various other acquisition regulations 
and echoes the desires of controlled costs and delivery schedules of Better Buying Power, 
there is a large gap between the issuance of these specific rules and efficient acquisition 
programs. The new instruction does not bring the DOD’s acquisition system any closer to 
the efficient model that has been sought since the Packard Commission, and the 
problematic characteristics of an “increasingly bureaucratic and overregulated process” 
remain. (President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, 1986, p. 44) 
The defense acquisition system needs reform. 
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The development of this research has brought to light several areas for further 
research. First, a study of the importance of should-cost is necessary, including a 
determination of whether it should be used as a metric for acquisition programs. While 
should-cost is a new term in defense acquisition, the concept is not. More research on 
“should-cost” as a metric would provide insight to the acquisition community on a topic 
that is still not fully understood. 
Secondly, the development of a baseline for acquisition timelines would be 
valuable to the acquisition community. It is recommended that the blueprint provided 
above should be used as a template to gather the data to populate the charts and formulate 
the average baseline for the various acquisition models. 
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Also, the entire review and information requirements process above the program 
office level is fertile ground for further research. Former USD (AT&L) and recently 
appointed Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter has stated that this is specifically an 
agenda item for him. He plans to work with the House Arms Service Committee to 
reduce the amount of red tape that program managers have to contend with (McLeary, 
2015). Any relief to the program offices would pay dividends, as these reviews and data 
calls take time and resources from an already overstressed acquisition system.  
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APPENDIX.  DODI 5000.02: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE 2008 
(OLD) AND 2015 (NEW) VERSIONS 
The summary of changes reported in this appendix is built from the Defense 
Acquisition University’s PowerPoint on the subject (DAU, 2014). 
 
• The Integrated Test & Evaluation enclosure in the 2008 version was modified and 
expanded to focus on OT&E. The new instruction added a new enclosure for 
DT&E.  
• The Resource Estimation enclosure in the 2008 version was expanded to a more 
detailed enclosure for Cost Estimating and Reporting, and a new enclosure was 
added for the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). 
• A new enclosure, Affordability and Investment Constraints, was added and 
emphasis was placed upon affordability throughout the life-cycle discussion. 
• A new enclosure was added for Life-Cycle Sustainment Planning. 
• The new instruction has removed emphasis on the term “evolutionary 
acquisition.”  However, the new instruction maintains emphasis on providing 
incremental capabilities, particularly for software intensive systems.  
• The new instruction places strong emphasis on the development of Request for 
Proposals (RFP) prior to release.  
• The new instruction provides six program models for milestones (as opposed to 
one model in 2008), other decision points, as well as a new process for acquisition 
of urgent needs. 
• The new instruction deletes blocks for “User Needs” and “Technology 
Opportunities and Resources” linked to the material development decision 
(MDD) on the 2008 model. 
• The new instruction requires full funding in Future Years Defense Program 
(FYDP) at each milestone (MS), starting at MS A. 
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• The new instruction provides a revised tabular listing of required information 
items. 
• The new instruction updates program dollar thresholds for ACAT I, IA and II 
programs to FY2014 constant dollars 
A. CHANGES TO MILESTONES AND OTHER MAJOR DECISION POINTS 
(1) Material Development Decision 
The new instruction added the additional requirement for Major Defense 
Acquisition Programs for an approved AOA Study Plan and approval for the Study 
Guidance by the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. 
(2) Milestone A 
• Added the requirement for should cost management targets.   
• Deleted the Technology Development Strategy, and added the Acquisition 
Strategy. 
• Deleted the Test & Evaluation Strategy, and added the Test and 
Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP).  
(3) Capabilities Development Document (CDD) 
• The new instruction added that validation of the CDD is a requirements 
authority decision point prior to the Development RFP Release decision.  
• The new instruction clarifies that all non-key performance parameters 
(KPP) requirements are subject to cost-performance trades and 
adjustments in order to meet affordability and/or schedule constraints. 
(4) Development RFP Release Decision Point 
• The new instruction makes this the new name for the Pre-Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) point. 
• This decision point authorizes release of RFP and source selection for 







(5) Milestone B  
• The new instruction added the requirement to demonstrate compliance 
with affordability goals for production and sustainment via an independent 
cost estimate (ICE). 
• The new instruction provided authorization for MDA approval of 
advanced procurement of long lead production items for LRIP, or full 
production. 
• The new instruction deleted post-critical design review assessment. 
(6) Milestone C 
• The new instruction changed the purpose of MS C from authorizing entry 
into LRIP, to authorizing entry into Production and Deployment. 
• The new instruction deleted, “…MDA shall make the decision to commit 
the Department of Defense to production at Milestone C…” and added a 
provision for combining Milestones B and C for high-cost first articles, 
such as ships and spacecraft that typically do not produce prototypes 
during EMD. 
(7) Full-Rate Production or Full Deployment Decision 
• The new instruction added explanatory text for this decision point. The 
MDA will consider any new validated threat environments that might 
affect operational effectiveness, and may consult with the requirements 
authority to ensure capability requirements are current. 
• The new instruction changed “Beyond LRIP Report” name to “DOT&E 
Report on Initial Operational Test and Evaluation.” 
 
B. CHANGES TO ACQUISITION PHASES 
(1) Materiel Solutions Analysis (MSA) Phase  
• The new instruction added the requirement to select a Program Manager 
(PM) and establish a Program Office prior to MS A. 
• During MSA, the new instruction also added the requirement for the 
component combat developer to prepare an Operational Mode 
Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP) that will include the operational 
tasks, events, durations, frequency, operating conditions and environment 
in which the recommended materiel solution is to perform during each 
mission and each phase of a mission. The OMS/MP is to be provided to 
the PM and to industry as an attachment for the next RFP. 
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(2) Technology Maturation and Risk Reduction (TMRR) Phase 
• The new instruction replaces the previously named, “Technology 
Development Phase” to the TMRR Phase.   
• The new instruction added a decision point to validate the Capability 
Development Document (CDD). 
• The new instruction also added the requirement for the PM to finalize 
sustainment requirements for the Preliminary Design Review (PDR). 
• The Development RFP Release decision point was also added to this 
phase. 
(3) Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) Phase 
• The new instruction provided a broader description of Developmental 
Testing (DT) and Operation Testing (OT) requirements. 
The new instruction allowed concurrency between EMD and Production.   
(4) Production and Deployment Phase 
• The new instruction slightly changes the definition of LRIP to, “… 
establishes the initial production base for the system, provides the OT&E 
test articles, provides an efficient ramp up to full rate production, and 
maintains continuity in production pending OT&E completion.” 
• The new instruction changes Military Equipment Valuation to “General 
Equipment Valuation”* and moves description to Table 2, Milestone and 
Phase Information Requirements 
 
(5) Operations and Support Phase 
• The new instruction added the requirement for the PM to establish 








The new instruction includes 13 enclosures, of which five are new. Below is a 
brief review of their additions and/or deletions. 
(1) Enclosure 1: Acquisition Program Categories and Compliance 
Requirements 
• ACAT Thresholds: This enclosure increases thresholds for all programs 
and baselines them to FY 2014 constant dollars. 
 
• Changes to Program Information: The 2008 instruction had three tables for 
statutory, regulatory information, and milestone requirements. Enclosure 
1, Table 2 in the 2015 DODI 5000.02 consolidates all ACATs into one 
table for “Milestone and Phase Information Requirements.”    
 
(2) Enclosure 2: Program Management 
This enclosure is seven pages and replaces enclosure ten of the 2008 version. 
• This updated enclosure added the requirement that a Program Executive 
Officers (PEO) must have been a PM of a program comparable to the 
programs he/she will be responsible for as a PEO. This enclosure also 
added the requirement that PMs have prior experience in similar 
acquisition programs. 
• The enclosure added descriptions of acquisition strategies, the PM’s role, 
competition, business approach, risk management, integrating 
international acquisition, and exportability considerations into the 
acquisition strategy. 
• The enclosure added Program Baseline Development and Management 
(includes EVM, risk management, cost baseline control and use of “should 
cost”) 
• The enclosure also provided descriptions of the structure of a Program 
Office and a Joint Program Office. 
• The enclosure added Intellectual Property (IP) Strategy Open 






(3) Enclosure 3: Systems Engineering 
This enclosure is eight pages and replaced enclosure 12 of the 2008 version. It 
added detail on the Systems Engineering Plan (SEP) and the systems engineering trade-
off analysis. 
(4) Enclosure 4: Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E) 
This enclosure is new to the 5000.02. It provided an overview of DT&E and 
responsibilities and includes 17 key activities of a robust DT&E program. This enclosure 
also requires the use of the TEMP as the primary test planning and management 
document. 
(5) Enclosure 5: Operational and Live Fire Test and Evaluation 
This enclosure replaced enclosure six of the 2008 version. This version removes 
the Test and Evaluation Strategy, requiring use of the TEMP henceforth.  
(6) Enclosure 6: Life Cycle Sustainment 
This enclosure is new to the 5000.02. It consolidated and added to sustainment 
related information in the previous instruction. 
(7) Enclosure 7: Human Systems Integration 
This enclosure replaced enclosure eight of the 2008 version, however it does not 
introduce any new material. 
(8) Enclosure 8: Affordability Analysis and Investment Constraints 
This is a new enclosure and provides an overview of affordability and information 
about the Life-Cycle Affordability Analysis. 
(9) Enclosure 9: Analysis of Alternatives 
This is a new enclosure to the 5000.02. It consolidated and added to the AOA 
discussion in enclosure seven of the 2008 version.  
(10) Enclosure 10: Cost Estimation and Reporting 
This enclosure replaced enclosure seven in the 2008 version. Additions include: 
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• Information on when DCAPE conducts ICE and independent cost analyses 
for MDAPs and MAIS 
• Guidance for DCAPE reviews of cost estimates and analysis 
• Requirement to fully-fund to the component cost position in the FYDP at 
MS A, B, C and Full Rate Production (FRP) 
• Clarification on the relationship between the DCAPE, the DOD 
Components, and the PM 
• Cost Analysis Requirements for multi-year acquisitions 
 
(11) Enclosure 11: Requirements Applicable to All Programs Containing 
Information Technology (IT) 
This enclosure replaced enclosure five from the 2008 version. Additions include: 
• Definitions of IT, and Information Systems 
• Post Implementation Review (PIR) 
• DOD Enterprise Architecture requirement 
• Cybersecurity Strategy for all IT acquisitions 
 
(12) Enclosure 12: Defense Business System (DBS) 
This enclosure replaces enclosure eleven in the 2008 version. This update adds 
revised DBS governance procedures, documentation and review requirements, and the 
requirement for annual re-certification. 
(13) Enclosure 13: Rapid Fielding of Capabilities 
This is a new enclosure. This enclosure provides procedures and policy for the 
acquisition of capabilities to fulfill urgent operational needs. 
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